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I. INTRODUCTION

E
FFICIENT maintenance of medical data in an electronic format is crucial for enhancing the quality and efficacy of healthcare through efficient information sharing. However, along with the benefits is the growing concern about the security of digital medical information. In a broad sense, security issues pertaining to digital medical data are categorized into the following aspects [1] , [2] : 1) Confidentiality: individual privacy of patients as well as physicians implies that medical data must be protected from inappropriate disclosure. Only authorized users with appropriate rights are offered access to the data. 2) Authentication: authentication (reliability in [1] and [2] ) of medical data can be further classified into a) integrity: medical information must be assured of its intactness; b) authenticity: credibility must be given to the users that the underlying data are what they are claimed to be. 3) Availability: medical data must be guaranteed to be readily available to the authorized users. Medical imaging constitutes an important part of digital medical data. Clearly, the attacks that threaten digital medical information as a whole (see e.g., [3] and [4] ) would also apply to medical images. In this paper, we explor the authentication aspect of medical images.
Multimedia authentication inherits many characteristics of generic data authentication using cryptographic primitives, such as integrity verification, authenticity verification, and nonrepudiation [5] . However, multimedia authentication has its own unique features that make the techniques for generic data authentication insufficent and sometimes undesirable. For example, an image changing from one format to another without losing visual content should be deemed authentic in multimedia authentication, whereas this turns out to be hard to achieve by applying generic data authentication that uses message authentication code (MAC) or digital signature [5] . As a result, multimedia authentication is normally accomplished by digital watermarking [6] , [7] . Digital watermarking can be classified into copyright watermarking and authentication watermarking, based on the purposes it is intended for. We note watermarking can also be used to establish a channel for carrying, e.g., meta-data [8] - [10] . In a strict sense, this application of watermarking belongs to the area of steganography, since the objective is to hide medical data in a host image for data secrecy purposes. In copyright watermarking, the inserted mark, upon extraction, asserts ownership of the underlying data. To achieve this end, copyright watermarking must be robust so that the inserted mark cannot be easily removed. In contrast, authentication watermarking is designed to prove the integrity and authenticity of the underlying data. Authentication watermarking can be further classified into hard authentication and soft authentication [11] . Hard authentication detects and rejects any modification to the multimedia content except for lossless compression and format conversion with equivalent visual content, while soft authentication allows for admissible content modifications while rejects malicious manipulations. The lack of a clear distinction between admissible and malicious operations is one of the main challenges for soft authentication. Clearly, authentication watermarking represents a viable solution to authentication of medical images in our context. We note that medical practice is very strict with the management of medical data for clinical, ethical, and legislative reasons [1] , [12] . Thus, in many cases it, is often desirable that watermarking itself does not introduce any distortion to the medical images for the purpose of data authentication. For example, images used for court proof or for data archiving are strictly forbidden to be altered. However, it is well known that, normally, watermarking, including hard authentication watermarking, introduces perpetual distortions to the original data. This suggests that most of the existing authentication watermarking techniques are not satisfactory for medical imaging. To authenticate medical images, a watermarking scheme must possess reversibilitythe ability to recover the exact original content from a watermarked image. Watermarking working in such a reversible way is referred to as reversible (lossless, invertible, distortionfree, erasible, etc.) watermarking [13] - [18] in the literature. Reversible watermarking is regarded as a special form of hard authentication [11] . In this paper, we develop reversible watermarking schemes that are tailored for authentication of the electronic clinical atlas [19] - [21] , a particular type of medical images in palette format. Our motivations for studying reversible watermarking for electronic clinical atlas are:
1) This is in conformance with strict medical practice in general; 2) The atlas, in combination with other medical imaging modalities, has a wide spectrum of applications in functional neurosurgery, brain mapping, neuroeducation, and so on (see e.g., [20] - [22] ). Usability of these applications, many of which run in an online interactive mode, is determined largely by the accuracy of the underlying atlas and the brain data. This highlights the need for the authentication of the atlas by reversible watermarking; 3) As we shall discuss shortly, the atlas has some unique features, which make the existing reversible watermarking schemes inadequate. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide a brief background on multimedia authentication, and review related work on reversible watermarking and authentication of medical images. In Section III, we propose two tailored reversible watermarking schemes for authentication of the electronic clinical atlas, by exploiting the very nature of the atlas. We present experimental results in Sections IV, and V concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Background
Authentication of generic data has been well studied in cryptography [5] , where either a MAC or a digital signature is computed on and appended to a message [5] . The MAC or the signature is treated as accessory data, semantically distinguishable from the message itself. Though the generic approach does not in any way affect the fidelity of the data to be authenticated, it has some intrinsic limitations when applied for authentication of multimedia content: 1) a malicious intruder can easily separate and ruin the ancillary authentication payload, thereby disabling the authentication functionality; 2) the tagged payload is susceptible to normal file format conversion, so much so that even a simple resave operation will render it useless; and 3) the generic data authentication technique lacks the property of localization; i.e., the ability to determine the locations where modifications were made.
These limitations can be overcome using authentication watermarking which embeds a watermark payload into multimedia data, so that the payload is semantically combined with the data. The ability to localize tampering or determine the severity of tampering is another highly desirable feature of authentication watermarking [11] , [13] , [23] . Moreover, depending on the integrity criteria, authentication watermarking authenticates multimedia content in such a flexible way that hard authentication rejects every alteration, while soft authentication passes admissible operations. A stronger requirement in some scenarios; e.g., in military or healthcare, is the recovery of the exact original content from the watermarked data. Reg- ular watermarking does not possess such an ability. This calls for a special type of authentication watermarking-reversible watermarking-which allows for the recovery of the original data from the watermarked data. The fundamental principle of reversible watermarking is demonstrated in Fig. 1 . Note that the "recovery" process is where reversible watermarking differs from regular authentication watermarking. By "recovery," reversible watermarking can completely remove the introduced distortion and reconstruct the exact content of the original data, provided that the watermarked image is authentic.
B. Reversible Watermarking
Reversibility of digital watermarking has been explored for quite some time [24] , [25] , and progress within recent years proved its viability for authentication multimedia. The first known reversible watermarking scheme was due to [14] , and the method in [13] that followed employed the same idea of modulo addition to extend the classic patchwork algorithm. However, the embedding capacity of these methods is limited, and annoying artifacts may be caused in the underlying images. For these reasons, they are not very satisfactory for practical use. To overcome these limitations, Fridrich et al. [15] - [17] developed an elegant method for achieving reversible watermarking which works as follows: a bit plane that can be randomized without causing noticeable artifacts is losslessly compressed, so that the original bit stream B is shortened to B and the newly created space of |B| − |B | bits is used to accommodate the authentication payload h. Then, the original bit plane is replaced by B h for the purpose of watermarking, where denotes concatenation. During the authentication verification, B is decompressed to obtain B, which is, in turn, used to recover the original bit plane for the reconstruction of the original image. Practical schemes for virtually any commonly used file format including raw, uncompressed formats (BMP), lossy or transform formats (JPEG), and palette formats (GIF, PNG) were presented in [17] . As we will see later, however, the methods for palette format used by Fridrich et al. cannot be used to reversibly watermark the electronic clinical atlas due to the unique features of the atlas. The method of Fridrich et al. is a general approach, whereas it is not always optimal in certain aspects such as embedding capacity and image quality preservation.
Reversible watermarking proposed in [18] , [26] , and [27] often provides higher embedding capacity. In particular, the method in [18] creates extra space for the authentication payload by virtue of difference expansion, in conjunction with generalized least significant bit embedding. In contrast, the scheme in [26] adopts a totally different method to achieve reversibility; that is, circular interpretation of bijective transformations. Compression on the original data is avoided in [18] , and [26] . An added feature of [26] is that the watermarked content can endure certain lossy processing, and virtually none of the other methods has this property.
Localization is quite useful in some circumstances. The method in [28] is the only known reversible watermarking scheme that provides localization.
C. Authentication of Medical Images
The demand for authentication of medical images is enormous, due to the increasing needs of data exchange within medical community and with external parties such the as research institutes. The work in [29] highlighted the perspective of applying generic data authentication techniques such as the one-way hash function and digital signature for the authentication of medical images, while [12] demonstrated the applicability of digital signature in medical imaging.
The relevance of authentication watermarking in medical imaging for reversible watermarking and integrity control has been extensively discussed [1] . The work of [30] was based on the fact that a medical image is normally allowed to be separated into regions of interest (ROIs) and regions of noninterest (RONIs); the ROIs must be strictly preserved while the RONIs can be allowed for some modifications; consequently, the authentication payload of ROIs is inserted into the RONIs. A possible weakness of this method is that if an adversary can identify the RONIS, then the embedded authentication payload can be totally erased, thereby disabling the authentication functionality. The work in [31] made improvements over [30] by repeatedly inserting the payload closely around the ROIs. Moreover, the payload can be used to repair the ROIs in the case of minor alterations to the ROIs. A watermarking scheme for DICOM format images was proposed in [32] to guarantee the genuine link between a delivered image with the root part of its header. Specifically, the authentication payload on the information of the referring physician is inserted in the image content by a watermarking scheme.
III. TAILORED REVERSIBLE WATERMARKING SCHEMES FOR ELECTRONIC CLINICAL ATLAS
We first give a brief introduction to the electronic clinical atlas, discussing its uniqueness and explaining why the existing reversible watermarking schemes are not effective in watermarking the atlases. We then propose two tailored schemes to solve the problem.
A. An Introduction to Electronic Clinical Atlas
The electronic clinical atlas in palette format [19] - [21] is a special type of medical image: each structure contained in an atlas is filled completely with a single color. Fig. 8 (left) shows a typical atlas with dimension of 705 × 820.
The image file of an atlas semantically includes two parts: one is the palette (file header) that lists color indices and their corresponding RGB components, e.g., Fig. 2(a) ; the other part is the image data (file body) that represent each pixel by a color index, e.g., Fig. 2(b) . In Fig. 2 , the atlas containing a palette as shown in 2(a) and the image data as in 2(b) actually represents pixel values as shown in 2(c). It is clear that some regular embedding operations such as LSB modification of the image data is not appropriate for watermarking the electronic clinical atlas, because the image data of an atlas are color indices rather than RGB values, so indices of similar values may refer to quite different colors.
We next summarize in the following the uniqueness of the electronic clinical atlas.
1) U1. Most of the atlases are not "natural" images as opposed to the "natural" images that are commonly seen in daily life. A "natural" image normally presents smooth scene. In contrast, every structure in an atlas is of pure color (e.g., structures in the atlas in Fig. 8 (left) are homochromous), so that 1) the boundary along two adjoining structures is clear-cut; 2) any alteration within a structure by a different color would appear definitely noticeable. 2) U2. An atlas normally does not use up 256 colors, which is the upper bound that most palette images assume. On average, 30-100 colors are used to label the structures in an atlas. 3) U3. While the content of an atlas should be strictly protected, the palette can be permuted provided that the content (pixels) of the atlas is not affected. For example, the following scenario should be allowed: in Fig. 2(a) , the entries of (0, 255, 0) and (0, 0, 255) are permuted in the palette, and 1's in the image data [ Fig. 2(b) ] are changed to 2's and 2's are changed to 1's. This does not change the actual pixels. In principle, we can exploit the existing reversible watermarking schemes that were designed for palette images to fulfil the task of reversibly watermarking the electronic clinical atlas. Unfortunately, the only known schemes that were proposed by Fridrich et al. in [17] actually turn out to be unable to meet the needs due to the very nature of the atlases, as listed previously. To see this, we check the two cases distinguished in [17] with the electronic clinical atlas as follows.
Case 1) Palette with fewer than 256 distinct colors: The basic idea is to make at least two entries in the palette for color c, a most frequently occurring color in the image to be watermarked. If c already has two or more entries, nothing needs to be done. Otherwise, simply allocate an empty entry for c in the palette. This is feasible as the palette is not used up. We then suppose the indices of two entries of c in the palette are i and j, respectively. Then 0 is associated with i and 1 is associated with j. In embedding, the image is scanned in a defined pattern, e.g., row by row. When a pixel with color c is encountered, its color index is changed to i if a bit 0 is to be embedded, and changed to j otherwise. In extraction, the image is scanned in the same pattern, and the embedded binary stream is obtained depending on the indices , of color c. Embedding in this way does not alter the pixels at all, so no further reconstruction is needed. Due to U2, theoretically, it seems this scheme can be used for the electronic atlas. However, in practice it is not the case because this method requires adding an entry for a most frequent color c. This is not allowed, since further processing of the atlases; e.g., automatic extraction of the structure boundaries in an atlas [22] , would be interfered: in this processing, structures represented by different color indices would be recognized as different. While the palette of an atlas can tolerate some manipulations as suggested in U3, we should avoid causing interference to other uses of the atlas, and we are interested in the watermarking schemes that are compatible with the existing processing algorithms. Case 2) Full palette with 256 distinct colors: In case the palette is exhausted by 256 distinct colors, two colors c i (index is i) and c j (index is j) are chosen, such that |c i − c j | is small. Then 0 is associated with i and 1 is associated with j. In embedding, the image is scanned in a defined manner. If a pixel with c i or c j is encountered, its color index is changed to i if 0 is to be embedded, and changed to j otherwise. In extraction, the image is scanned in the same pattern and the embedded binary stream is obtained depending on the indices i, j of color c i and c j . It is easy to see that this scheme is also applicable to the first case, provided that an appropriate pair of similar colors is found. Clearly, this method is a good tool for watermarking "natural" palette images. However, as suggested in U1 electronic clinical atlas cannot be assumed "natural," so a color pair with minor difference does not always exist. Furthermore, even such a desired color pair is found, color flipping within a homochromous structure would be readily detectable.
We have shown the reasons why the reversible watermarking schemes for palette images in [17] cannot be used for watermarking electronic clinical atlas. In Subsections III-B and III-C, we shall propose two reversible watermarking schemes that are tailored for electronic clinical atlas, and the proposed schemes circumvent all these limitations. The first scheme is designed exclusively for the atlases that comprise homochromous structures, and the second scheme can be applied to any atlas, be it "natural" or not. 
B. Our First Reversible WatermarkingScheme
Intuitively, the main reason the method of Fridrich et al. in case 2 fails in our scenario lies in the fact that the structures contained in an atlas are homochromous. We thus tailor our first scheme exclusively for the atlases with homochromous structures, and this scheme is an extended version of [33] .
For the purpose of watermarking, we are faced with finding the right embedding channel and the way to insert the authentication payload in an atlas, while without causing perceptible artifacts. We observe that when a boundary point of a homochromous structure revises its color to its neighboring color, the effect caused is visually unnoticeable. On the contrary, if a point within a homochromous structure changes its color to even a similar color, the difference would be quite clear. Motivated by this, we shall exploit the boundary points of the homochromous structures for embedding. Meanwhile, to avoid generating accumulative artifacts, the points to be revised for watermarking should be uniformly diffused over the whole set of boundary points across an atlas. Moreover, we shall follow Fridrich et al.'s general methodology for achieving reversibility (see Section II). We next elaborate our ideas on these issues, and they are building blocks of the actual scheme.
1) Basic Ideas:
For ease of understanding, we take Fig. 3 as an example, which represents virtually all possible cases of how structures bordering one another along a row. In particular, along row i, structure A stands alone without neighbors; two structures B 1 and B 2 border each other; more than two structures in turn border each other (three structures C 1 , C 2 , and C 3 are used in the figure, and generalization to the scenario of more than three structures is straightforward). a) Embedding Channel: Along a row (row i in Fig. 3 ), we in turn pick up p 1 in A, p 2 in B 1 , p 3 in C 1 and p 4 in C 3 as channelling points for embedding, and the corresponding structures A, B 1 , C 1 , and C 3 as embedding structures. Note that every other structures in each group of neighboring structures are chosen as embedding structures. In our example, A, B 1 , C 1 and C 3 are chosen as embedding structures, while B 2 , C 2 are not embedding structures. As we shall see shortly, this is crucial in preventing interference in encoding between two neighboring structures if otherwise, every structure is chosen as an embedding structure. The embedding channel for embedding then comprises the channelling points collected by scanning all rows across an entire atlas. 
b) Encoding Primitive:
For an embedding structure, we associate 0 to the even number of points the structure has along a row, and 1 to the odd number of points. For example, along row i in Fig. 3 , structure A has six points, B 1 has four points, C 1 has five points, and C 3 has four points, so the path p 1 → p 2 → p 3 → p 4 is encoded as 0010.
c) Embedding Method:
The insertion of a bit-stream into the embedding channel is equivalent to encoding it along the channel. Rules on how to embed a bit at a channelling point p are specified in Table I .
In Table I , let the channelling point be p and the embedding structure that p lies in be Struct, "Number of points" denotes the number of points Struct has along the row that traverses p. By "No action," we do nothing to p; by "Change color," we revise the color of p to its left neighboring color. We include the case that the left neighboring color is the background color as long as Struct has no neighboring structure along the row.
To make it clearer, let us see an example of inserting a bitstream by executing the preceding rule. Suppose 1001 is to be embedded along the path determined by p 1 → p 2 → p 3 → p 4 in Fig. 3 , the embedding is shown in Table II. According to Table II , p 1 is changed to be the background color; p 2 keeps unchanged; p 3 is changed to be the background color; p 4 revises its color to be the color of C 2 .
The reason for choosing every other structures in a group of neighboring structures is now clear: otherwise, adjoining structures might mutually spoil each others' embedding. d) Recovering Method: We are faced with recovering the original channelling points by given the original coded stream. The original coded stream can be obtained because we assume Fridrich et al. methodology for reversibility in our scheme. It must be noted that the set of channelling points gathered from an watermarked atlas might be different from the original one due to watermarking. This can be easily seen from the above example of embedding 1001 along row i. In particular, the channelling points of A, C 1 , C 3 will change to be the respective right neighboring point of p 1 , p 3 , p 4 , and we denote them as p 1 , p 3 , p 4 , respectively. This is, however, in no way preventing us from reconstructing the original structures. Let us continue with the above example: for structure A, we know the current channelling point p 1 is actually the right neighboring point of the original point p 1 . From the watermarked atlas, we know the current code of p 1 along row i is 1. Once we are given the original code 0, since 0 = 1, we change the color of the left neighboring point of p 1 to be the color of p 1 in order to recover the structure A. Likewise, other embedding structures are recovered to their original content following the same rationale. Note that if the current code = the original code, the current channelling point is the original one, e.g.; p 2 in our example.
With these ideas, we are ready to give our reversible watermarking scheme.
2) The Scheme: Similar to a common authentication watermarking scheme, ours consists of two parts: embedding algorithm and authentication algorithm.
The basic steps of the embedding algorithm are demonstrated in Fig. 4 .
In particular, the embedding algorithm works as follows: a) Embedding Algorithm: i) Scan the atlas M row by row in a fixed pattern, e.g., from top to bottom. Along each row, pick up the channelling points p i by the method described in embedding channel. An ordered set is eventually formed by these points S = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . p N }, where N is the total number of the channelling points that are picked up. ii) Reorder S with a secret key k 1 by the following program:
} and shift left each of the items after idx in S j = j − 1 end S =S i, j, idx, andS are temporary variables in the program. Note that the reordering of S serves to evenly diffuse the positions that embedding is to occur. Otherwise, accumulative effect is possible if we embed row by row. In addition, this randomization reduces the likelihood that an attacker can figure out the exact embedding path, thereby increasing security. iii) Compute the authentication payload as h = H(M, k 2 ), where we let M denote the pixels (RGB , then the recovered atlas is authentic, otherwise it has been tampered.
3) Discussion:
In this scheme, we try to recover the original image without first considering whether the watermarked atlas had ever been tampered with. We can actually make some enhancements to this aspect. The basic idea is to insert an extra piece of authentication data of some areas in an atlas that are not affected by watermarking. We can determine such areas before watermarking occurs, because the length of the authentication data suffices help us decide the channelling points that will be affected by watermarking (see step iv) of the embedding algorithm). With such an extra piece of authentication data inserted, in step iv) of the authentication algorithm, we first extract this authentication data together with h , then use this authentication data to determine whether the not-to-be-affected areas has been tampered with. If no tamper is found, we proceed to recover the original image, otherwise, we simply reject. This improvement is of particular importance when data tamper indeed occurred, since in such cases there is no need and in fact, it is not possible to reconstruct the original content.
It is clear that the embedding capacity of this scheme is determined by the total number of channelling points as well as the effectiveness of the lossless arithmetic compression algorithm. Once the total number of channelling points is fixed, more compression effectiveness of the compression algorithm means larger embedding capacity.
We now examine security of this scheme. Specifically, without knowing the secret authentication key k 1 and k 2 , an adversary is faced with forging an arbitrary atlas M (with respect to a watermarked M ) in an attempt to pass the authentication. It is equivalent to the case that given a fixed hash value h, the value of H(M , k 2 ) happens to be h. Evidently, the probability for this is 1/2 |h| = 2 −128 when |h| = |H( · )| = 128, according to the collision free property of the cryptographic one-way hash function. As a final note, we point out the compression algorithm does not affect security of the watermarking scheme.
C. Our Second Reversible Watermarking Scheme
Our second scheme is applicable to any atlas in palette format, including those with homochromous structures. We develop this scheme by extending the zero-distortion method proposed in [34] to attain increased computational efficiency while without compromising its actual security. This second scheme does embedding by merely manipulating the palette of an atlas, thereby causing no distortion to the image pixels. The main difference between our scheme and Fridrich et al. in case 1 is that our scheme only involves permutation of the entries in the palette, whereas Fridrich et al. involves adding a new entry in the palette. Consequently, our scheme can be used for any palette image, whereas Fridrich et al. can only be applied to images with palette having fewer than 256 distinct colors.
1) The Scheme: The basic idea of our scheme is to arrange the palette according to the authentication payload of the atlas, such that a correlation between the palette and the image content is established. In authentication, the image is authentic if the correlation still holds. In particular, the scheme works as follows. 3) Sequentially move the rest colors in Vlist to the remaining entries after the first j entries in the palette (j is a fixed value when step 2) halts). Note that step 2) is the tricky part of the rearrangement process. The basic idea is that we simply ignore h i if h i is equal to any proceding h n , where 0 ≤ n < i. See the example in Fig. 6 , supposing h is partitioned into 6 segments. Since h 0 and h 4 refer to the same color in Vlist (h 0 = h 4 ), so h 4 is ignored and the entry that corresponds to h 4 in the palette is occupied by the color referred to by h 5 (the h 5 th color in Vlist). iv) Change the image data according to the new palette.
For example, when a color in the ith entry in the original palette is moved to the jth entry in the new palette, all i in the image data need to be modified to be j. 
i, j are temporary variables. Note that in this program, M is deemed authentic only when all h i , i ∈ [0, l) pass the testing. In this authentication procedure, h i will be ignored if it is equal to any preceding h n , where n ∈ [0, i) 2) Discussions: Our extension to the method in [34] (Wu's method for short) lies mainly in the following: the l segments of the authentication payload h in Wu's method must be distinct to one another. As a result, Wu's method may need to repeatedly feed a distinct random seed to the one-way hash function in computing the authentication payload until a suitable hash value is found. An contrast, the l segments of h in our scheme are not necessarily distinct, so we achieve higher computational efficiency. In addition, we do not need to remember the seed during data authentication.
In the sequel, we assume 2 m ≤ N < 2 m +1 , where N is the number of colors in the palette of an atlas. Clearly, m ≤ 8. Applicability of this scheme to electronic clinical atlas is discussed as follows. As each segment h i is used as a color index in our scheme, to guarantees that h i ≤ N and h i is as large as possible, |h i | should be equal to m. As a result, the total number of segments that the hash value h is partitioned is l = |h|/m. Moreover, clearly l should be less than or equal to N , that is, l ≤ N ⇒ |h|/m ≤ N ⇒ |h|/m ≤ 2 m . Assume |h| = 128, then m ≥ 5. This suggests that for an atlas to be watermarkable, it has to have at least 32 colors in the palette.
Next, we shall examine the actual security of this scheme. In particular, we aim to determine the upper bound for the probability of successful forgeries by an adversary without knowing the secret authentication key k. That is, we want to answer the following question: given an watermarked atlas M , in what probability can an arbitrarily forged M (M = M ) by the adversary pass the authentication process? As we just discussed, it should hold that 5 ≤ m ≤ 8 and 2 m ≤ N < 2 m +1 , where N is the number of colors in the palette of an atlas. Therefore, an 128-bit hash value would be accordingly partitioned into l segments, where 16 ≤ l ≤ 26.
We start with a simple example by assuming l = 4.
where M denote the pixels of a watermarked atlas M and k is the secret authentication key. Without loss of generality, suppose h 0 = h 2 , so upon watermarking the first four entries (0th, 1th, 2nd, third) in the palette of M would be the colors referred to by h 0 , h 1 , h 3 ,h 3 , respectively, whereh 3 refers to the random color that occupies the third entry. This can be shown in Fig. 7(a) . According to the authentication algorithm, a forged M would be deemed authentic as long as h = H(M , k) satisfies any of the four cases shown in Fig. 7(b) : 1) each of segment h 1 , h 2 , and h 3 of h is the same as h 0 ; 2) each of segment h 2 and h 3 is the same as either h 0 or h 1 ; 3) segment h 3 is the same as either of h 0 , h 1 and h 3 ; 4) h = h 0 h 1 h 3h3 . In total, there would be nine possible values for h that could pass the authentication. Specifically,
We proceed to generalize the above simple example to the general case of any value of l. That is, given the first l entries of the palette that correspond to h = h 0 h 1 . . . h l−1 , we discuss what values h can take so as to pass the authentication. Generalizing the cases in Fig. 7(b) , we know that h taking value as h = h 0 h 1 
. The probability P r of an adversary forging an arbitrary atlas M that could be deemed authentic is thus P r = 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We implemented and conducted extensive experiments on our proposed two schemes. Experiments were done on a PC with 2G CPU and 512M RAM. Source codes were written in Microsoft C++. The hash function H( · ) in our schemes was instantiated by MD5 [5] which offers 128-bit hash values.
A. Experiments With the First Scheme
In the experiments with the first scheme, we used truncated hash values of 64 bits. From the previous security discussions, we know this achieves a confidence factor of 2 −64 , which is a sufficiently small probability for forgery. For lossless compression, we used the LZW compression algorithm [35] , which works well when the streams to be compressed have repeated patterns. In addition, in the experiments we authenticate the set of boundary points of structures contained in an atlas. The reasons are: 1) in our current applications [22] , we utilized the boundary points rather than the entire content of an atlas itself; 2) the set of boundary points is a compact representation of the corresponding atlas, and the integrity of the boundary points of an atlas is equivalent to the integrity of the atlas, since every change of the atlas pixels will be reflected in the set of boundary points gathered by the algorithms in [22] ; and 3) this is expected to accelerate the computation of authentication payload, because less data are feed to the hash function, although this acceleration is theoretically minor. We leverage on the algorithms proposed in [22] to extract the boundary points of atlases. Fig. 8 shows an atlas and the set of boundary points within it.
From the experiments, it is estimated that on average, 3000-4000 channelling points could be found in an atlas, and most of the atlases are watermarkable by our first scheme. Fig. 9 shows an example of our experimental results: Fig. 9(a) is the original atlas, Fig. 9(b) shows the positions where embedding occurs and Fig. 9(c) shows the corresponding watermarked atlas. It can be seen from Fig. 9 (b) that the revised points had been well diffused, which is due to the output randomness of the hash function used in the reordering of the channelling points. Since embedding occurs upon the boundary points of structures, so no apparent distinction is seen between Figs. 9(a) and (c) .
B. Experiments With the Second Scheme
Experiments with the second scheme focused on the program implementation and testing applicability of the scheme. Other factors such as image quality degradation are not a concern, since the scheme only involves permutation of the palette and the visual appearance of the atlases is not affected at all. Fig. 9(d) shows a watermarked atlas by our second scheme that corresponds to Fig. 9(a) . As we have discussed earlier, an atlas is watermarkable if it has 32 or more colors in the palette. In fact, all the atlases we experimented have more colors than 32.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed two tailored reversible watermarking schemes for authentication of the electronic clinical atlas. The first scheme was designed exclusively for atlases with homochromous structures, and followed Fridrich et al.'s general methodology for achieving reversibility; the second scheme can be applied to any atlas in palette format, and incurres zerodistortion to the watermarked atlas by simply manipulating the palette. A weakness of the second scheme is that while it attains the authentication functionality by detecting every tampering to the image content, it can generate false positives: an adversary can permute the entries in the palette, and modify the image data accordingly without changing the image content. In such cases, the authentication algorithm will report tamperings. This weakness is actually the price that must be paid for zero-distortion. We implemented the proposed schemes and obtained promising experimental results.
